In January 1945, a new armoured vehicle was issued to the anti-tank regiments of the infantry divisions in 2nd Canadian Corps. There were two of these regiments: the 2nd and 3rd, in 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions respectively. The new vehicle was known to the army as the “17-pounder Valentine SP”, SP meaning self-propelled, but the British Ministry of Supply named it the “Archer”, and that is how it is commonly known today.

The Archer does not have a strong presence in Canadian memory of the Second World War. In Northwest Europe, it only served for four months, and there are no examples in any of our museums. C. P. Stacey was generally vague about anti-tank equipment in The Victory Campaign, and in a recent article in Legion Magazine, the authors misidentified Archers in Groningen as M-10s.

To the Archer’s harshest critics, it was “quite useless”, but the Archer was a good solution to a serious problem for the anti-tank artillery. It greatly improved the effectiveness and flexibility of the gunners equipped with it. In the Rhineland campaign and the liberation of the Netherlands, the Archer went side-by-side with Canadian infantry.

Back in 1942, the British General Staff had decided that they wanted self-propelled anti-tank guns that could keep up with tanks. They ordered M-10s from the USA, but in case not enough were available, they also put out a tender for a vehicle to be made in the UK. This needed to mount the 17-pounder gun, and have a low profile to make it easy to conceal. This was based on the British experience in the desert, in which anti-tank gun crews found themselves at the receiving end of every type of German attack possible once they were spotted. Vickers-Armstrong submitted the design of the Archer, based on the components of the old Valentine tank. To obtain a low profile, they mounted the gun backwards on the small chassis. By the time production began in April 1944, Britain was beginning to convert M-10s to mount the 17-pounder. The Archer was declared obsolescent, and there was no immediate plan to put it into service. It appeared to be little more than a make-work programme.

However, two Archers were sent to Normandy in July so that officers of 21st Army Group could inspect them. By that point, British and Canadian anti-tank regiments had become very unhappy with the towed 17-pounder gun. It was very large, and the standard Field Artillery Tractor had great difficulty moving it off-road. This forced the men to move it into position by hand, before also digging it in. This was difficult, time-consuming work, during which the men were more vulnerable to enemy fire.

So, the officers who saw the Archers greatly approved of the design. They felt that any self-propelled 17-pounder would be an improvement, and the Archer’s limited field of fire to the rear was not a serious problem. Artillery purists were reassured that the Archer looked like a gun, and not a tank.

The British and Canadian armies discussed the issue in August 1944 and decided to equip the anti-tank regiments in their infantry divisions with the Archer. However, due to the tempo of the campaign and a lower shipping priority for the Archer, adoption did not begin until November.

The two Canadian regiments received 12 Archers each in January 1945. 3rd Anti-Tank Regiment had been equipped with 16 M-10s from D-Day until this point. According to the regiment’s war diary, the men “felt the loss of their M 10s, but [were] very rapidly acquiring a healthy respect for the Valentines.”

These anti-tank regiments were made up of four batteries, in each of which were three troops. One troop in each battery was now equipped with three Archers. During operations one battery would be placed under the command of each brigade in the division, with one troop supporting each battalion. The fourth battery would remain in reserve.

By now, however, the attacks and counter-attacks of the desert war were long over. There were not many instances in which the Archer was actually used in its intended anti-tank role.

On the 8th of February, First Canadian Army launched Operation Veritable as part of a pincer movement to capture the area west of the Rhine which faced 21st Army Group. During Veritable, the largest anti-tank engagement in the war which involved Archers took place. This was the battle for the Goch-Calcar Road, which was fought to establish the start line for the follow-up Operation Blockbuster.

On the 19th of February, 2nd Canadian Infantry Division launched a set-piece attack with 4 Brigade to seize positions along the road, with massive artillery support, tanks, and Kangaroos. The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry were on the left, and the Essex Scottish on the right. The ‘Rileys’ soon took their objectives, but the Essex Scottish had a more difficult time, and the Germans began to counter-attack both regiments. Following standard armoured doctrine, at dusk the Shermans withdrew, but a troop of Archers joined the ‘Rileys’. Overnight, elements of the Panzer Lehr division made multiple attacks against both regiments. The Rileys were barely able to hold their ground after calling up the men left out of battle, while the Essex Scottish were overrun by German tanks and infantry. Pockets of the regiment continued to hold out, but could not prevent the Germans from moving through the area to attack the Rileys.

On the 20th, the Germans made several attacks on the Rileys supported by Panthers and Jagdpanthers, but were ultimately unsuccessful. In one of these attacks, three German AFVs were knocked out by a single Archer. Major Louis Froggett said of this,

“If those tanks had gotten through D Company, they would have hit Battalion Headquarters and rolled up the battalion. They were stopped right in front of the milk factory [where the headquarters was located], less than a hundred yards away.”

During the day, the Royal Regiment of Canada and supporting forces fought for and retook the positions of the Essex Scottish. Panzer Lehr made one more unsuccessful attack that evening, and then withdrew. Altogether, the Germans lost seventeen tanks and Jagdpanthers in the battle, and the Archers accounted for seven of these.

In addition to defending against German attacks, the Archer participated in the so-called “pepperpot” element of artillery bombardments, in which guns of all sizes fired on the enemy. Archers came supplied with the gear needed to aim and fire indirectly, which some towed 17-pounders were also receiving. After the men received training in indirect fire, the Archers of both regiments contributed to the huge bombardments that began Operations Veritable and Blockbuster, as well as other, smaller barrages.

They were also called upon to knock out observation posts in strongly constructed buildings. The point of this, of course, was to prevent the Germans from being able to see Allied troop movements and direct their artillery fire. The 17-pounder gun was better at this than the field artillery, because of its accuracy and its ability to deliver a mixture of armour piercing and high explosive rounds. For instance, towards the end of Blockbuster, an Archer put 13 rounds into a windmill in Xanten the day before 2nd Division launched its attack to take the town. Towed guns were also used against observation posts, but the gunners knew that German artillery would quickly return fire on them. The Archer’s ability to start up and leave immediately made it a safer to use for the job.

Later, when 2nd Canadian Corps advanced into the Netherlands, Archers were put to a variety of duties on the flanks. From 6th to 13th April, one battery of 3rd Anti-Tank Regiment guarded a five-kilometer stretch of the IJssel river on the left flank of 3rd Division. Some of the gunners took on the role of infantry, while the Archers acted as armoured support. The Archers harassed German positions on the far side of the river, and successfully counter-attacked patrols which crossed the river at night and attempted to infiltrate into the settlement of Bronkhorst.

Further north on the evening of 12th April, 108th Battery joined Toronto Scottish machine gunners to protect the left flank of 2nd Division as it drove towards Groningen. This wide-ranging ‘defence’ led to two platoons of carriers and a troop of Archers entering the town of Meppel the next morning - so far west that it was actually on 3rd Division’s route north. The Germans had only just left, and the Dutch gave the Canadians a heroes’ welcome. After driving through the town, the Archers guarded the bridges while the Toronto Scottish captured German stragglers.

But, after the crossing of the Rhine the Archers spent most of their time providing close support to the infantry. Within the corps, the force responsible for infantry support was 2 Armoured Brigade, which had 135 Shermans available, excluding headquarters tanks. The Corps also had 6th Anti-Tank Regiment with two batteries of M10s which sometimes supported the infantry, but in this period, they had other tasks to perform.

135 tanks were by no means enough to provide constant, universal support to two infantry divisions. 2nd and 3rd Anti-Tank Regiments now had 30 Archers between them. There were plenty of opportunities for them to assist when Shermans were not available.

The Rhine crossing began during the night of 23th March. 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade crossed on the morning of the 24th, and that evening a troop of Archers from 3rd Anti-Tank Regiment were among the first AFVs to be ferried over. Possibly the bitterest fighting of the landings had been taking place in the villages of Speldrop and Bienen. The troop moved towards Bienen with the North Nova Scotia Highlanders the next day. Then, sometime after midnight a German self-propelled gun had knocked out a supporting British tank and was suppressing two platoons of the North Novas. The troop of Archers, commanded by Lieutenant Anderson was called up. Sergeant Comeau followed the sound of the German AFV in the dark, and to confirm its position they fired a machine-gun at it. When the Germans returned fire with their own machine gun, the tracer bullets revealed their position. One of the Archers promptly fired, knocking it out.

The following morning, Lieutenant Anderson and a major of the Highlight Light Infantry of Canada spotted another German self-propelled gun down the road to Millingen, along which the North Shore Regiment would soon advance. Anderson ran back for his Archer, and they set it on fire with the first shot.

On the 30th March in the city of Emmerich, the Germans counter-attacked the Royal Winnipeg Rifles from the north. One of their self-propelled guns pinned down a company of the Winnipegs. Sergeant Darrow Gomez, commanding an Archer, was asked to deal with it. After a reconnaissance under small arms fire, he flanked the German AFV with his Archer and knocked it out. Gomez then went on another reconnaissance with Major Denison of the Winnipegs. Eventually they located another German self-propelled gun which had been firing on the infantry, but the Major was killed right next to the Sergeant. Probably after Gomez returned to his Archer, it was hit twice by shellfire and the driver severely injured. The Sergeant and his two remaining men positioned the Archer and then waited until artillery and an air-to-ground attack by a Typhoon distracted the Germans. They then drove into the open, turned, and disabled it with one shot.

Archers continued to support the infantry through the Netherlands and into Germany. They fired – along with tanks and field artillery – at some targets on the causeway linking Friesland with North Holland. During the battle for Groningen, German snipers, machine guns and flak guns completely pinned down c Company of the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry near the one of the bridges. No tank support was available, but an Archer from the troop that had supported the Rileys at the Goch-Calcar Road came to their rescue, knocking out enemy positions in the upper stories despite fire from the upper stories at their open-topped vehicle.

The success of the Archer was affected by several underlying conditions. First and foremost, Allied air superiority enabled the Archer to move about more freely. The Archer’s thin armour and open top would have made it vulnerable to enemy air attack. Secondly, the weakness of the German armoured force created the opportunity for the Archer to be used in other roles. Had German forces been stronger in these regards, the Archer would have had to been used much more conservatively.

Overall, the Archers in the two regiments knocked out a dozen German AFVs. Only three Archers were lost to enemy weapons – one to mines and two to shelling. The fact that none were knocked out by towed anti-tank guns or infantry weapons is remarkable, and speaks to their careful deployment.

Medal citations from the battle at the Goch-Calcar Road consistently mention the gunners moving their Archers to new firing locations after the Panthers were spotted. This was clearly important. It probably involved positioning the Archers where they could shoot at the tanks from the flank, which reduced the chance of them being spotted, and gave them the opportunity to fire at weaker side armour.

Moving also reduced the gunners’ casualties so that they could continue the fight. The crew of a towed gun under fire had to choose between fighting, or abandoning the gun to take shelter. Veteran Les Goff was one of the men who crewed the Archer which knocked out the three AFVs that threatened the Rileys’ headquarters. He remembered that immediately after they fired those shots, German artillery began to zero in on them. Their Sergeant suffered a minor injury from shrapnel. The driver then moved the Archer safely behind a building.

By destroying so many AFVs in the battle, these Archers played a vital role in the defense. Had the troop been equipped with towed guns, it seems doubtful they would have done so well. The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry lost 125 men in the battle, and the Essex Scottish 204. Had their anti-tank defence failed, the Rileys might have suffered just as badly as the Essex Scottish.

Firing on observation posts and close support targets also reduced infantry casualties. The most frequent of these targets were buildings containing infantry with small arms, a machine gun post, or sometimes a sniper.

The Archer troops were busy at this throughout April. An extreme case was that of 20 Battery, which on the 29th of April reported that the men of the Archer troop were getting very tired. This battery was under the command of 5 Brigade in 2nd Division. Rather than supporting one infantry battalion and resting when that battalion rested, these Archers were being switched from one battalion to another – nine times in April – so they could support as many attacks as possible. If the towed guns had all been replaced with Archers, this would have been unnecessary, but the rate of production of Archers in the UK was not fast enough to make that possible. It also does not appear that the commanders of the other brigades were pushing their Archers so hard, but the inconsistent level of detail in the war diaries does not let me state this with certainty.

The war diary of 3rd Anti-Tank Regiment provides some valuable insight into how the Archer was viewed at the time. The commanding officer, Lt-Colonel William McMullen, added a page of commentary to the war diary every month. In March, he wrote that “one lesson was well learnt by the Regiment. That is, that [self-propelled] anti-tank equipment is far superior to towed anti-tank guns at any role.” Since his regiment had used the M-10 for much longer than the Archer, it seems clear - that to him, the mobility of a self-propelled gun was far and away its most important quality.

In April the regiment’s second-in-command, Major Boothe, wrote that the Archers had been used to provide close support to the infantry with no losses, but since the Archer could only fire from the rear, he did not consider it a practical close support weapon. This was also the general consensus of the regiments in 21st Army Group.

Despite not being ideal, however, the Archer had succeeded in this role. A history of the 3rd attributed their success to “the high level of marksmanship on the part of the gun crews. Time and time again, enemy [self-propelled guns] and strong points were knocked out by the first round fired.” High praise, but in the battles described earlier, the gunners of these two regiments demonstrated not only marksmanship, but also bravery, cleverness, and determination.

In 1945, Allied victory was certain, but soldiers had to carry on the offensive day after day to achieve it. Canadian anti-tank gunners had given a defensive role which was of decreasing importance. Equipped with the Archer, however, they could not only defend but also knock out observation posts, protect the flanks, and provide close support to the infantry. Although not many in number, they certainly contributed their share to the defeat of Nazi Germany. They, and the equipment they used, deserve to be better remembered.

This paper was presented at the 36th Canadian Military History Colloquiem at Wilfred Laurier University in 2026.

© 2026 Christopher Camfield